Former Royal Navy commander Steve Jermy argues that Western leaders fundamentally misunderstand the Russia-Ukraine war, pursuing a political narrative rather than a coherent strategy, and are sleepwalking into a catastrophic conflict with a nuclear-armed power that holds overwhelming escalation dominance and economic leverage.
Russian Strategy in Ukraine: Five-Phase Analysis
Russia is fighting an existential war for its survival, not a war of conquest, and has executed a deliberate five-phase strategy that the West has consistently misread.
Phase one (February–March 2022): A limited force of ~190,000 troops — far too few to occupy Ukraine — used military pressure to force diplomatic negotiations, which produced a draft agreement (neutrality for Ukraine, self-determination for Donbas) that Boris Johnson, with U.S. backing, persuaded Zelensky to reject.
Phase two (spring–summer 2022): Recognizing NATO would fight via Ukraine, Russia conducted a “militarist withdrawal in contact” to the prepared Surovikin Line, a defensive belt designed by General Surovikin.
Phase three (late 2022–late 2023): Attritional defense — holding the line while wearing down two successive Ukrainian armies in futile offensives, achieving the operational objectives of “denazification” and “demilitarization” while preserving Russian forces.
Phase four (late 2023–present): Offensive attrition — slow, grinding advances not primarily for territory but to continue destroying Ukrainian manpower and materiel, leveraging Russia’s industrial mobilization and Ukraine’s lack of air superiority.
Phase five (emerging): Strategic endgame — securing a permanent buffer zone, likely the four annexed oblasts plus Crimea at minimum, possibly extending to the historic Novorossiya region (Odessa and four western oblasts) to protect Russian populations and establish defensible borders.
Western Motives for Confronting Russia
Western policy is driven by political narrative, not military strategy, with shifting objectives that reveal strategic incoherence.
A 2018 RAND study (“Extending Russia”) and statements by Ukrainian intelligence chief Budanov suggest an original aim of breaking up Russia or forcing it into NATO via war.
Institutional lag: NATO expanded eastward without anticipating Russia’s response or preparing defenses, despite warnings from Kennan (1996), Mearsheimer (2014), and Putin himself.
Deep-seated Russophobia in European elites — fueled by media narratives, moral licensing (hatred of white Russians carries no social penalty), and domestic political spin — has replaced rational analysis.
The neoconservative faction in Washington, London, Paris, and Berlin may genuinely seek Russia’s dismemberment, but this objective is militarily impossible and strategically suicidal.
The Crisis of Western Leadership
Jermy assesses the current Western leadership cohort as the worst in his lifetime (since 1976), marked by incompetence, not malice alone.
Kaja Kallas (EU foreign policy chief) and Ursula von der Leyen (Commission president) exemplify promotion of manifestly unqualified figures; Kallas’s rhetoric is described as childish, moralizing, and historically illiterate.
Mark Rutte (NATO Secretary General) continues a pattern of weak leadership; the alliance suffers from “institutional blinkered thinking” across political, military, diplomatic, and intelligence establishments.
Strategic thinking — defined by effectiveness, endurance, and efficiency — has failed in every intervention this century: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and now Iran.
NATO “exists to confront a threat created by its own existence, yet doesn’t have the power to confront the threat its existence has created” — a self-licking lollipop that guarantees its own irrelevance.
Scenario: Russian Strikes on Europe (September 2025)
Jermy’s article “The Coming War with Russia” models a scenario (not a forecast) where Russia strikes European drone/missile factories in Britain, France, and Germany with hypersonic missiles in September 2025, after repeated warnings against deep strikes into Russia.
Article 5 invocation would fracture NATO: Hungary and Spain would likely refuse participation; other members would equivocate; the U.S. would almost certainly decline to commit troops to fight on European soil.
Europe’s only military response would be air power, which would fail against Russia’s battle-hardened air defenses — saturation drones, ballistic missiles, and hypersonics against which Europe has virtually no defense (Patriot PAC-3 estimated at ~3% effectiveness per MIT’s Ted Postol; zero hypersonic intercept capability).
Russia would then “take the gloves off,” surgically targeting European energy infrastructure: LNG terminals (Milford Haven, Rotterdam), oil depots, and grid nodes — replicating its Ukraine campaign.
Europe has already sanctioned itself off Russian oil (40% of diesel), gas (40% of supply), and diesel (critical for farming, logistics, construction, and maintaining renewables/nuclear), creating a structural energy deficit.
The Strait of Hormuz closure (simultaneous in scenario) removes ~20 million bpd, delivering a second energy shock; Europe imports ~12 million bpd and has no strategic reserves left (U.S. SPR at ~20%).
Energy-GDP coupling (~0.99 correlation) means a 10% energy loss translates to ~10% GDP contraction — depression-level economics, triggering political collapse.
Nuclear Escalation Risks
If Britain or France responded with nuclear weapons, it would be national suicide: Russia holds ~5,500 warheads vs. ~200 each for UK/France; Russian doctrine mandates nuclear response to attacks on its nuclear triad.
Jermy doubts European leaders would choose suicide, but notes their track record of “suicidal incompetence” (cheering Nord Stream destruction, enabling mass migration).
A more plausible Russian escalation: selective conventional strikes on German/Polish production facilities, testing whether France/UK would sacrifice their nations for Berlin — a question with no certain answer.
The 2024 Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian strategic bomber airfields (exposed under START treaty verification) crossed a nuclear red line; Russia’s restraint was deliberate, not weakness.
Energy Vulnerability and Economic Consequences
The West is on the edge of an energy crisis masked by lag effects: tankers move at 12 knots (~bicycle speed); pipeline flow is 3–8 mph; inventories and SPRs have been drawn down.
China’s demand destruction (~5 mbpd) and massive SPR (1.3 billion barrels) temporarily buffered prices, but this is not sustainable; China may have acted partly to protect export markets (Taiwan semiconductors, Japan, Korea).
Jermy expects significant recession visible by August–September 2025; recovery from strait closure takes multiples of the closure duration (Suez blockage: 1 day closure = 6 days logistics recovery).
No single entity controls global energy markets — they are market-driven, ungovernable, and no “tsar” can press buttons to restore flow; shipping companies simply refuse transit under threat.
Mathematical certainty: removing energy from a globalized system contracts GDP proportionally; no nation retains true sovereignty when it doesn’t control its energy supply.
Oil Market Dynamics and Price Anomalies
Brent at ~$71 (July 2025) despite 4+ months of Hormuz closure reflects futures-market lag and the crack spread between paper prices and physical delivery.
Physical crude in Singapore reportedly traded at ~$200/barrel — the real price signal; futures markets are decoupled from reality.
At $150–200 oil, the global financial system faces a 2008-style crash: Lufthansa canceled 20,000 flights; bunker fuel doubled; eurodollar funding markets tightening.
U.S. is a net crude importer (~6.5 mbpd) despite refined-product exports; oil fungibility means price shocks transmit globally regardless of source access.
Rising energy costs into U.S. midterms would be politically explosive for the administration.
Conflict Trajectories: Middle East and Ukraine
Iran war: U.S. cannot win without hundreds of thousands of ground troops (no political appetite); closure of Hormuz and economic pain may force U.S. withdrawal by midterms; China/Russia could broker closure.
Ukraine war: Putin may wait for Europe’s economic crisis to force a political reckoning — Germany already in recession, UK/France on the edge; at 5% GDP defense spending, European publics will revolt.
Alternative Russian endgame: a political decapitation strike on Kyiv (not for military gain but to collapse the Zelensky government), which Russian general staff has likely war-gamed.
Diplomacy is the only exit, but the West refuses to engage Russia directly (excludes Putin from peace talks) — diplomatic malpractice; even during the Troubles, UK maintained backchannel talks with IRA.
Putin’s Decision Calculus
Putin is under domestic pressure from siloviki (GRU, military, security services) to respond more forcefully, but Jermy assesses him as a deeply strategic leader who holds his nerve.
Oliver Stone interviews and Philip Short’s biography reveal a man who thinks in decades, not news cycles, and is well-served by a highly competent General Staff (which managed a 10-year Afghan exit in good order vs. NATO’s 20-year collapse).
Likely Russian escalation ladder: 1) Call White House to declare intent; 2) Call Berlin, Paris, London with ultimatum to stop deep-strike weapons; 3) Precision conventional strikes on production facilities — measured, not maximalist.
Timing depends on: battlefield trajectory, European economic collapse, and intelligence on imminent long-range missile launches from E3 factories into Russian territory.
The West’s refusal to study its opponent — like a coach ignoring game film — guarantees strategic surprise; Russia is more serious, more committed, and more capable than NATO.
